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INTRODUCTION

Two years ago this review published an article which reviewed search and seizure law in Alaska.' Because the local bar
and bench seem to have found that article to be useful, it appeared
worthwhile to put together a similar review of the remainder of
Alaska's law of criminal procedure. Like its predecessor, this article will review and analyze the law of criminal procedure in
Alaska, isolating those areas in which the Alaska Legislature or
the Alaska Supreme Court has departed from the prevailing approach to procedure in criminal cases and predicting probable
outcomes to procedural issues still unresolved in Alaska.
A.

Sources of ProceduralRights

Procedural rights in Alaska, in addition to those provided by
the United States Constitution emanate from four sources. First,
Article I of the State Constitution contains various sections which

parallel and broaden the provisions of the Bill of Rights found in
the United States Constitution. For example, Section 72 of Article
I expands the traditional entitlement to due process of law by adding "the right of all persons to fair and just treatment in the
course of legislative and executive investigations." Similarly, Sections 113 and 124 of Article I establish a constitutional right to
release on bail,5 a matter not addressed in the Federal Constitution.
1. Feldman, Search and Seizure in Alaska." A Comprehensive Review, 7 UCLAALASKA L. REV. 75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FeldmanI.
2. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just treatment
in the course of the legislative and executive investigations shall not be infringed."
3. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § II provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve; except that the legislature may provide
for a jury of not more than twelve nor less than six in courts of record. The
accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
released on bail, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.
4. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Penal administration
shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public."
5. The constitutional right to bail is codified in AS § 12.30.010 et seq; see Part 11(B)
of this Article infra. For other cases in which the Alaska Supreme Court has construed
provisions of the Alaska Constitution more broadly than comparable provisions of the
Federal Constitution, see Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977) opinion on rehearing, 573 P.2d 858 (Alaska 1978) (search and seizure); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565
P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) (search and seizure); Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977)
(right to counsel at pre-indictment line-up); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976)
(equal protection); Yarbor v. State, 546 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1976) (speedy trial); Scott v. State,
519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974) (self-incrimination); RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971)
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Title 12 of the Alaska Statutes provides a second source of
procedural rights. In most instances, these rights have been codified from court decisions involving constitutional issues. Exceptions to this pattern of codification can be found in the provisions7
arrests, 6 rights of a detainee after arrest,
regulating misdemeanor
8
bail.
on
and release
The Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted by the
Alaska Supreme Court, constitute the third source of procedural
rights. As will be discussed later in this article, the Criminal
Rules, as adopted, construed, and applied by the Alaska Supreme
Court, have provided a broad basis for the expansion of procedural rights in several important areas. For example, grand jury
practice9 and discovery' 0 in criminal cases have been substantially
modified by the provisions of Alaska's Criminal Rules.
In exercising its authority as the final arbiter of the meaning
of the three sources noted above, the Alaska Supreme Court constitutes the fourth source of procedural rights. This article will
highlight and analyze the court's more important decisions in
criminal procedure.
The Alaska Supreme Court has noted in several cases that the
protections afforded by various provisions of the State Constitution may be broader than those provided by parallel provisions of
the federal constitution.11 For example, in Zehrung v. State 2 the
court interpreted Article I, Section 1413 of the Alaska Constitution
as affording arrestees a greater protection from warrantless preincarceration inventory searches than that provided by the United
States Supreme Court in decisions applying parallel provisions of
the Federal Constitution. Similarly, the decision in Baker v. City
of Fairbanks'4 enlarged and broadened the right to a jury trial.
(jury trial in delinquency proceeding); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska
1970) (jury trial).
6. See AS § 12.25.030.
7. See AS § 12.25.150.
8. See AS § 12.30.010-.080.
9. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6 and Part 11 (D) of this article, infra.
10. See ALASKA R. CiuM. P. 16 and Part 11 (E) of this article, infra.
11. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d
386 (Alaska 1970).
12. 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977).
13. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
14. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
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Remedies

Once a procedural violation has been established, four remedies may be applied. First, evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement officers may be suppressed 5 by the trial court. Alaska
follows the federal lead in this area and routinely applies the exclusionary rule adopted in Wong Sun v. United States.' 6 Recent
decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court indicate that the Wong
Sun exclusionary rule has not lost favor in Alaska; 17 the court
declined, however, to remedy use of excessive force by police officers in arresting a defendant by excluding evidence which was a
product of the arrest. In State v. Sundberg18 the Alaska Supreme
Court reversed Superior Court Judge Victor Carlson who had
granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence derived from
his arrest which was effectuated by a police officer who shot Sundberg as he fled. Because there were no facts supporting a reasonable belief by the officer that Sundberg was armed or dangerous
(he fled from the scene of a property offense), Judge Carlson ruled
that he had been subjected to an "unreasonable seizure" in being
shot and, therefore, granted the defendant's motion. The Alaska
Supreme Court reversed, holding that use of excessive force by
police officers can be remedied by disciplinary action or civil suits
and the exclusion of evidence is not warranted. These remedies
exist, of course, for all constitutional violations by police officers
including warrantless searches and oppressive and coercive interrogation. The Alaska Supreme Court distinguished Sundberg on
the grounds that the use of excessive force by Alaska police officers has not been so widespread as to mandate application of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy. The record on this issue, however
was very "thin", and is the subject of considerable disagreement
among attorneys, judges and commentators.
Certain procedural violations can be remedied by the granting of a continuance or other intermediate sanctions.' 9 For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that violations of
discovery provisions should usually be remedied by the granting
of a continuance or 20the imposition of monetary sanctions against
the offending party.
15.
(Alaska
16.
17.
(Alaska
18.

Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976); State v. Spietz, 531 P.2d 521
1975).
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
State v. Cassell, 602 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1979); Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189
1977).
611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).

19. See Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631 (Alaska 1977); Scharver v. State, 561 P.2d 300
(Alaska 1977). But see Stevens v. State, 582 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1978).
20. Des Jardins v. State, 551 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1976). The effectiveness of this ap-

proach is discussed in Part H (E), infra.
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Dismissal of the prosecution constitutes a third possible remedy that can be appropriate in certain instances. 21 Serious violations of the rules regulating the grand jury process 22 require that
the indictment be dismissed and the matter submitted again to the
grand jury. 23 In certain instances where the trial court fails to correctly remedy procedural violations, the Alaska Supreme Court
will reverse judgments of conviction on appeal. 24 It should be
2
noted that Rule 47 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure
precludes the court from reviewing allegations of error at trial unless an objection was raised and properly preserved by the parties
below. "Plain error"--error affecting "substantial rights of the accused"-will be reviewed by the court on appeal even if not raised
below. 2 6 Finally, even if properly preserved, errors which are
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 27
will result in the court's affirmance of the conviction on appeal.
The remainder of this Article catalogs procedural rights in
criminal cases at the various stages of the criminal proceeding.
Part I discusses rights during investigation and arrest, including
an update on search and seizure, identifications, statements, confessions, and entrapment. Part II considers procedural rights during the pretrial stage, subsequent to the initiation of charges. The
right to counsel, bail, preliminary hearing, grand jury indictment,
discovery, and speedy trial are included among these rights. Part
III discusses procedural rights during trial, including the right to a
jury trial, procedure on entry of guilty and nolo contendere pleas,
severance, presence of the defendant, and sentencing. Part IV
completes the discussion with a review of post-trial issues raised
by the sentence modification petitions and double jeopardy
problems.
I.

A.

RIGHTS DURING THE INVESTIGATIVE STAGE

Arrests
Authorization for making arrest is set forth in Chapter 25 of

21. Stevens v. State, 582 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1978).
22. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6, 7.
23. Adams v. State, 598 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1979); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40
(Alaska 1976).
24. Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978); Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251
(Alaska 1977).
25. ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 47 (a) provides: "Harmless error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
26. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 47(b) provides: "Plain error. Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court." See also Stork v. State, 559 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1977).
27. State v. Hannagan, 559 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1977).
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Title 12 of the Alaska Statutes. 28 Both private persons and peace
officers are authorized to make arrests in Alaska. The procedure
for arrests without a warrant is different, however, for felonies and
misdemeanors. A warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor offense in
Alaska may be made only when the crime is committed or attempted in the presence of the person making the arrest.29 Thus,
arrests for misdemeanors based upon statements obtained from
third parties or other circumstantial evidence may be made only
with a properly issued and executed arrest warrant.
With respect to arrests for felonies, Alaska follows federal
procedure. A warrantless arrest for a felony offense may be made
.when a felony has in fact been committed and the person making
the arrest has probable cause for believing that the arrestee committed it.30 The probable cause requirement is satisfied where the
facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the person making the arrest, which he has reason to believe are trustworthy, are
sufficient to warrant a person of prudence and caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed it. 3 1 In City of Nome v. Ailak, 32 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that probable cause cannot be established
solely on the basis of a good faith belief on the part of the officer
that probable cause to arrest exists. The details of any information obtained from informants and cooperative citizens must be
33
verified before a valid arrest may be made.
As will be observed in several instances throughout this article, the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Legislature have
carved out exceptions to certain procedural rights where the accused is charged with the offense of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OMVI). OMVI
is the only misdemeanor offense for which a valid warrantless arrest can be made merely on probable cause, even if not committed
in the presence of the arresting officer. 34 Thus, if the officer arrives on the scene of a traffic accident and the driver is out of his
vehicle, a valid arrest for OMVI may still be made if the officer
can establish probable cause from witness statements or other cir28. See Jacobson v. State, 551 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1976); Howes v. State, 503 P.2d 1055
(Alaska 1972).
29. AS § 12.25.030; Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969).
30. Compare City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1977) with United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) and United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
31. Pistro v. State, 590 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1979); Richardson v. State, 563 P.2d 266
(Alaska 1977).
32. 570 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1977).
33. Id.
34. See AS § 12.25.033 which authorizes a warrantless arrest for OMVI offenses, even
if not committed in the presence of the officer, when the officer has probable cause to
believe the offense has been committed less than eight hours prior to the arrest.
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cumstantial evidence, even though the vehicle is not operated in
the officer's presence.
As discussed in the prior article on search and seizure, the
validity of an arrest is of critical importance. 35 A valid arrest permits searches, seizures, and other intrusions by law enforcement
36
officers as lawfully incident to the arrest without a warrant.
Similarly, an unlawful arrest triggers suppression by the court of
any evidence seized or statements obtained as a result of the ar37
rest.
B.

Other Detentions

Alaska has adopted a more restrictive view of permissible detentions involving less than probable cause than have the United
States Supreme Court and most state courts. In Coleman v.
State,38 the Alaska court held that a stop and frisk search on less
than probable cause can be made in instances where the officer
has a reasonable suspicion of imminent public danger or serious
recent harm to persons or property. Coleman involved an investigatory stop for a recently committed rape-robbery. The stop on
less than probable cause in that case was sustained by the Alaska
court because of the seriousness of the offense committed and the
very close geographical and temporal proximity of the stop to the
39
commission of the offense.
Following the Coleman decision, some confusion existed in
Alaska's trial courts concerning the type of public danger or the
seriousness of the harm to persons or property which would justify
an investigatory stop or frisk. The matter was clarified by the subsequent decision in Ebona v. State.4° In Ebona, the Alaska court
confirmed that Alaska's temporary stop rule is more restrictive
than the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio .4' Ebona involved an investigatory stop of a motor
vehicle by a police officer who observed erratic and dangerous
driving. The court sustained the stop, stating:
35. Feldman, supra note 1, at 105.
36. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Schraffv. State, 544 P.2d 834
(Alaska 1975).
37. Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127
(Alaska 1971).
38. 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
39. The majority noted its concern that stops and frisks on less than probable cause
should not be extended beyond situations requiring immediate police response to protect
the public in serious cases where there is a likelihood of imminent danger or where serious
harm has recently been perpetrated to persons or property. 553 P.2d at 45-46 n.17.
40. 577 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1978).
41. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); La Fave,
Street Encounters and the Constitution. Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV.
39 (1969).
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The significant dangers to persons or property that can possibly
result when the operator's capacity to control a motor vehicle is
impaired are apparent. A vehicle out of control, .

.

. poses a

to the property or individuals in proximity to
significant threat
42
the vehicle.
C.

Search and Seizure

Both federal and Alaska decisions have held that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to
those areas in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.4 3 In Smith v. State, 4 Alaska adopted a two-pronged test for
determining the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy. That test requires, first, that the person exhibit an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy in the area and, second, that the
expectation be one which is recognized as "reasonable" by society.4 5 The expectations of privacy held by parolees and probationers were severely limited in Roman v. State 46 and Gonzales v.
State.47 In those cases, the Alaska Supreme Court held that parolees and probationers have diminished expectations of privacy
and are subject to warrantless searches so long as there is a direct
relationship between the purpose of the search and the underlying
offense. 48 The court held that conditioning probation or parole
upon consent by the probationer or parolee to periodic searches
might be permissible in cases involving convictions for sale of narcotic drugs or concealing stolen property. The intrusions were justified by the need to ensure that the prohibited activities did not
continue. On the other hand, a person who has been convicted of
a felony such as reckless driving or manslaughter should not be
subjected to searches and seizures just because he is a parolee.
The goals of rehabilitation of the individual and protection of the
public do not require that such a parolee be subject to searches in
a manner different from any other member of the public.
In justifying the warrantless search in Roman, the court
stated:
[W]e.

.

. recognize that conditioning release on some forms of

search by correctional authority is both consistent with the goal
42. 577 P.2d at 701.
43. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Woods and Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793
(Alaska 1973).
44. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
45. For further discussion see Feldman, supra note 1, at 86.
46. 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977).
47. 586 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1978).
48. But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir.
1975).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

19801

of rehabilitation and necessary for the proper functioning of the
parole system. To this extent, parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy. Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to
search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand
muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions. Released offenders subject to searches and seizures conducted pursuant to such conditions would be protected
from undue
49
harassment by the limitations of due process.
Diminished expectations of privacy of parolees and probationers extends to entries into dwellings as well as searches. In
Soroka v. State,5 0 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the warrantless entry by a probation officer into a probationer's trailer as a
"justifiable visit."
Inventory searches made by prison guards of an arrestee's
personal effects is another area where the Alaska court has provided broader privacy protection than have the federal courts. In
Zehrung v. State,5' the court held that an inventory search cannot
be made of an arrestee's personal effects where he has been arrested for a petty offense and may post bail within a reasonable
period of time. The Zehrung court did not define the procedures
to be followed where the offense is not "petty" or where it is unclear when the arrestee might post bail. The issue was resolved in
Reeves v. State.52 That court stated that a general, unrestricted
search of the personal effects of a person who is to be incarcerated
may not be made by law enforcement or prison officials. Rather,
any intrusion or search must be limited to the extent necessary to
preclude the introduction of weapons and contraband into the
prison community. In Zehrung, where the arrestee had been
placed in custody for a minor traffic offense, a search of the arrestee's wallet revealed a stolen credit card ultimately linking the defendant to a rape charge. In Reeves, a search by prison officials of
the arrestee's personal effects revealed a balloon in a shirt pocket
which, when further examined, was found to contain heroin. Because the personal effects of the defendants in both cases were to
be inventoried and held by prison officials, the court condemned
both searches as unrelated to any reasonable security need of the
prison.
Two recent cases have involved application of the "consent
search" exception to the warrant requirement in drunk driving
cases. In Anchorage v. Geber,5 3 the Alaska Supreme Court held
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

570
598
569
599
592

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at 1242 (footnotes omitted).
69 (Alaska 1979).
189 (Alaska 1977).
727 (Alaska 1979).
1187 (Alaska 1979).
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that the State's implied consent statute,5 4 which imposes a ninetyday administrative suspension of a driver's license upon the operator's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer examination, does not
permit the forcible extraction of blood samples from a drunk driving suspect. On the other hand, the court in Wirz v. State 55 held
that a drunk driving suspect is not entitled to an affirmative warning by police officers of his right to withhold his consent and refuse to submit to a blood or breathalyzer examination. Because of
the absence of a specific requirement to advise arrestees of their
right to refuse the breathalyzer test, the court concluded that it
it to engraft such a requirement in the
would be inappropriate 5for
6
implied consent statute.
The emergency exception to the warrant requirement was the
subject of concurrences in State v. Myers.5 7 In Myers, police officers encountered an unlocked doorway of a Juneau movie theater. Suspecting criminal activity, the police officers entered the
theater and arrested the defendant. On appeal, the majority of the
Alaska Supreme Court found that as a search, the entrance to the
theatre was "reasonable" under the circumstances. 58 The majority
did not attempt to analyze the search in terms of any previously
existing exceptions to the warrant requirement or to articulate any
specific standards or guidelines limiting future intrusions of similar nature. Rather, the "wild card of general reasonableness" 59
was used to justify the search. The concurring opinion by Justice
Rabinowitz and the dissenting opinion by Justice Boochever sustained the search 60as within the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.
The decision in State v. Glass6 1 is the most important addition to Alaska's tapestry of search and seizure cases. In that case,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers
could no longer electronically eavesdrop on suspects through a
"false friend" without a search warrant or application of one of
54. AS § 28.35.031. See also Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
55. 577 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978).
56. AS § 28.35.031. Contrast with State v. Freymuller, 552 P.2d 867, 868 (Or. App.
1976) and State v. Annen, 504 P.2d 1400 (Or. App. 1973) (OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805 was
construed as granting a right to refuse the breathalyzer test).
57. 601 P.2d 239 (Alaska 1979).
58. The majority opinion seems to suggest reasonableness based on implied consent
or, at least, the implied absence of objection on the part of the owner of the theater to entry
by law enforcement officers.
59. Id. at 245 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
60. Justice Boochever previously considered the emergency exception in his concurring opinion in Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 848 (Alaska 1975).
61. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
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the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 62 The decision in
Glass was based on the right to privacy embodied in Article I,
Section 2263 of the State Constitution. In a majority opinion by
then Chief Justice Boochever, the court stated:
[W]e believe that Alaska's privacy amendment prohibits the secret electronic monitoring of conversations upon the mere consent of a participant. . . .The meaning of privacy of necessity
must vary depending on the factual context and the often competing interests of society and the individual. The protection
has been defined, for example, as the right "to be let alone," the
right of persons "to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to
others," and the right which protects "the individual's64interest
in preserving his essential dignity as a human being."
Thus, Glass recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations and personal affairs.
The court directed that, with limited exceptions, a search warrant
must be obtained before electronic monitoring of conversations is
proper. The court declined to comment on whether the require65
ment of a warrant may be obviated by exigent circumstances.
D.

Identfiocations

Due process and right to counsel issues have been raised by
Alaska cases discussing the appropriate procedures for suspect
identifications. In Kimble v. State,66 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that an accused has no constitutional right to counsel at a
pre-accusation photo identification by witnesses, but declined to
follow the federal approach on the right to counsel at lineups.
The court in Blue v. State67 recognized an accused's right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup absent exigent circumstances which
62. The supreme court subsequently decided in State v. Glass, 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska
1979), that the opinion in the first Glass case would not be applied retroactively.
63. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 provides: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section."
See also State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d I (Alaska 1978) (possession of cocaine for personal use in the home not protected); Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d
469 (Alaska 1977) (certain information communicated to physicians is within zone of privacy); Woods and Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) (warrantless administrative inspections of private business premises prohibited); Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d
351 (Alaska 1977) (state may control sexual conduct of juveniles); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d
494 (Alaska 1975) (possession of marijuana by adults for personal use in the home protected). See also, Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day ofthe Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 928-37 (1976).
64. 583 P.2d at 879-80 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 881. Compare Alaska's treatment of electronic eavesdropping with the
United States Supreme Court opinion in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
66. 539 P.2d 73 (Alaska 1975).
67. 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977).
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precluded the presence of counsel. 68 The court held that where
adequate time and opportunity exists and where there is no com-

pelling immediacy, the right to counsel must be afforded at such
lineups.
Both photo and lineup identifications must be fair and not
unduly suggestive. Police conduct which tends to isolate or single
out the defendant, such as the failure to provide a sufficient
number of photographs or persons at a lineup, or the failure to
achieve reasonable similarity among the photographs or persons
in the array, constitutes a serious due process violation remediable
by suppression of any identification made by the witness. 69 A subsequent in-court identification by the same witness at trial would
similarly be suppressed unless the prosecution could establish an
independent basis for the identification
not tainted by the prior
70
suggestive photo array or lineup.
Although Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 7' obliges an accused to provide handwriting exemplars or
other physical evidence which might be used for identification, the
taking of such evidence after an indictment has been returned
constitutes a critical stage of the criminal proceedings at which the
72
accused has a right to counsel.
E.

Statements and Confessions

1. Generallimitations. With respect to statements and confessions, Alaska has followed Miranda73 principles and federal applications of the fifth amendment, 74 with certain exceptions. The
Alaska Supreme Court severely limited the fifth amendment pro68. Id. Compare Blue with Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
69. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Note, Due Process Consideration in Police
Show-up Practices, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 377 (April 1969).
70. See cases collected in Annot., Admissibility of Evidence of Photographic Idenification as Affected by Allegedly Suggestive Identication Procedures, 39 A.L.R. 3d 1000 (1971).
71. In accordance with the constitutional guidelines, ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c) requires a defendant to disclose certain non-testimonial identification information, including
participation in a lineup, providing voice samples, fingerprints, posing for photographs,
trying on of articles of clothing, permitting the taking of physical specimens of blood, hair,
and other materials of his body, and submission to a reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body.
72. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969).
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
74. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution is paralleled by ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 8 which provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the armed forces in time of war or public danger. Indictment may be waived by
the accused. In that case the prosecution shall be by information. The grand jury
shall consist of at least twelve citizens, a majority of whom concurring may return
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tection available to juveniles in EL.L. v. State.75 In that case, the
court required a juvenile to testify before a grand jury considering
an indictment for statutory rape or face a contempt citation. The
holding was based on the rationale that, as a juvenile, the witness
was not subject to incarceration or criminal penalities for such testimony and therefore could not raise a fifth amendment privi76
lege.
The question of whether or not private persons are required
to provide Mirandawarnings to suspects was considered in Tarnef
v. State.77 In Tarnef, the court found that a private investigator
had been working so closely with the police that he was required
to provide Miranda warnings prior to questioning a suspect. The
investigator had promised to turn over any statement he obtained
to the police, the police consulted with the investigator to confirm
the accuracy of the statement, and the investigator 78subjectively
perceived his position to be part of the official team.
A suspect is entitled to an admonition of his fifth amendment
79 In Quick v. State8 0
rights as soon as he is placed "in custody.
and Hunter v. State 8 the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a reasonable person test for determining whether or not a suspect is
deemed to be in custody. 82 The test focuses on whether a "reasonable person" in defendant's position would believe that he had
been deprived of his freedom in any significant way. In making
this determination, the court examines the manner and scope of
the actual interrogation, events which took place before the interrogation (including those which explain how and why the defendant came to the place of questioning), and, where relevant, what
83
happened at the interrogation.
2. Waiver. While the right to remain silent and the right to
the assistance of counsel may be waived by a suspect, any such
an indictment. The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended.
75. 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977).
76. Contrast with discussion of right to counsel in juvenile proceedings in Part 11 (A)
infra.

77. 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973).
78. Whether or not private persons, private security officers, private police or private
detectives are within the prohibitions of Miranda depends upon the facts of the given case.
See People v. Polk, 63 Cal. 2d 443, 406 P.2d 641, 47 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); People v. Price, 63
Cal. 2d 370, 406 P.2d 55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1965); People v. Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692,
57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1967); 31 A.L.R. 3d 565, 647-74 (1970); Comment, Seizure by Private
Parties- Exclusion in CriminalCases, 19 STAN. L. REV. 608 (1967).
79. Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973).
80. 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
81. 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979).
82. Id. at 895.
83. Id. at 895. But see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
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waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently. 84 In Ladd v.
State,85 the Alaska Supreme Court held that retention of an attorney by an accused does not per se invalidate a waiver of Miranda
rights. 86 In R.L.R. v. State,87 the Alaska court declined to adopt a
rule that juveniles are inherently incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving their fifth amendment rights. Instead, the
court held that such rights could be waived by the juvenile. 88 In
Quick v. State,8 9 however, the court softened the impact of this
ruling by holding the state has a heavier burden in proving an
intelligent waiver by a juvenile than by an adult. 90 In fifth
amendment waiver cases, whether the suspect be an adult or a
juvenile, the Alaska court has adopted a case-by-case approach
for testing the integrity of the waiver.
3. Voluntariness. Like the federal courts, Alaska looks to
the "totality of the circumstances" when deciding whether a confession or statement has been made voluntarily. 9' Voluntariness
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence 92 and may be
negated by evidence of such factors which might have affected the
judgment of the suspect as mental condition, age, education, and
93
experience.
4. Additional requirements. Miranda warnings must be
made with clarity and precision. In State v. Cassel,94 the Alaska
Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of a defendant's statement where the officer had advised the defendant that he "could"
have a lawyer. The court found the officer's admonition vague
and imprecise and, under the circumstances, insufficient. 95
Statements made by an accused which are not prompted by
interrogation or questioning by law enforcement officers are not
suppressed, even in the absence of a Miranda warning. In Eben v.
State,96 the court sustained the admission of statements made by
the accused during the course of a telephone call to his girlfriend
84.
(Alaska
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
(Alaska
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1977); Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923
1973).
568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977).
Id. at 966-67.
487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
Id. at 33.
599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 720.
Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1977); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907
1973).
Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 917 (Alaska 1973).
Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350, 1363 (Alaska 1977).
602 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 418.
599 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1979).
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from the police station and made to his brother while at the jail
which were overheard by police officers.
F. Entrapment
Traditionally, Alaska courts have applied an objective test for
entrapment by police officers. In Grossman v. State,97 the court
held that it would examine whether the conduct by the officers
would have induced an "average" person into the commission of
the act.98 This standard was relaxed in Pascu v. State.99 Finding
that sufficient evidence had been presented to establish the defense of entrapment, the majority held that law enforcement officials cannot implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit an offense and then induce commission of
that offense in order to prosecute. Quoting language in Grossman,
the court stated: "[Uinder standards of civilized justice, there
must be some control on the kind of police conduct which can be
permitted in the manufacture of crime."'1° An even more forceful
articulation of this view was contained in the concurring opinion
by Justice Pro Tem Dimond. Justice Dimond wrote:
I believe it is essential to have'objective morality and ethics in
law, because this is essential to the "civilized justice" that the
majority refers to. If I am correct, then it is repugnant to that
concept to justify the apprehension of criminals on the basis
that the end justifies the means-i.e., that it is proper to utilize
the tools of lies and deceit to effect criminal justice.' 0 '
The precise limits of police conduct created by the entrapment doctrine are not clearly discernible from either Grossman or
Pascu. Pascu does, however, suggest a shift from emphasis on the
predisposition of the defendant to the conduct of the officers.
II.

PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS

Between the formal initiation of criminal charges and trial, a
variety of constitutional, statutory, and rule provisions furnish
procedural rights for the accused. As will be discussed below,
Alaska has adopted a particularly liberal view regarding pre-trial
02
procedural rights. In defining a defendant's rights to counsel,
97. 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969).
98. Under Grossman, the accused must carry the burden of establishing a defense of
entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. See also Batson v. State, 568 P.2d 973,
978 (Alaska 1977).
99. 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978).
100. Id. at 1068. Compare with stricter standard in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973).
101. 577 P.2d at 1069.
102. AS § 12.25.150; Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). Compare
with Martinez v. State, 423 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1967).
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release on bail, 10 3 rapid arraignment, 1°4 fair grand jury proceedings, 10 5 discovery of the prosecution's case, 0 6 and a speedy
trial, 0 7 the Alaska Legislature and Supreme Court have broadened the federal rules and protections afforded a criminal defendant. The expansion of pre-trial procedural rights is consistent with
the policy articulated by the Alaska courts favoring full and fair
disclosure by the prosecution and prompt adjudication as means
of removing the prosecution's tactical advantage in criminal proceedings. 10 8
A.

Right to Counsel

The court has broadened the right to counsel during the pretrial stage following the initiation of criminal charges.
Article I, Section 11109 of the Alaska Constitution parallels
the right to counsel provision contained in the federal constitution." t0 Interpreting that state provision, the Alaska Supreme
Court has held that an accused has a right to counsel at adversarial proceedings where formal charges are initiated.I' It is important to segregate fifth amendment self-incrimination problems
from sixth amendment right to counsel issues. An accused may
have a right to counsel during interrogations and other evidencegathering activities, even in the absence of formal charges or an
adversarial proceeding, if fifth amendment (self-incrimination)
problems are presented."12
In Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 1 3 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel exists in any case where a
defendant may lose a valuable license, be incarcerated, or be fined
in an amount reflecting criminality.' 14 Thereafter, the court in
103. AS § 12.30.010-080; Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1977); Gilbert v. State,
540 P.2d 485 (Alaska 1975); Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1974).
104. AS § 12.25.150; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5.
105. State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1976); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40
(Alaska 1976).
106. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16; Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979); Stevens v.
State, 582 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1978); Des Jardins v. State, 551 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1976).
107. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45; DeMille v. State, 581 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1978); Nickels v.
State, 545 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1976).
108. Peterkin v. State, 543 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1975).
109. See note 3 supra.
110. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
11. Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1979). Compare with Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); andOrozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324 (1969).
112. Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979); Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923, (Alaska
1973).
113. 490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971).
114. The extension of the right to counsel in Alaska closely parallels the limit set on the
right to a jury trial in Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
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Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court"15 held that the
right to counsel does not exist for an offense carrying a maximum
fine of $100.00. Current practice in district court precludes a jury
trial for any offense carrying a maximum fine of $300.00. Other
areas in which the court has broadened the right to counsel include proceedings for civil contempt for failure to pay child support,116 probation revocation hearings, 117 and prison disciplinary
hearings. " 18
In addition, the court in A.A. v. State' 19 recognized the right
to counsel at juvenile disposition proceedings. The holding in
A.A., while recognizing the importance of representation at juvenile proceedings, is analytically inconsistent with the reasoning in
E.L.L. v. State. 2 0 In E.L.L., the court required a juvenile to testify or face a contempt citation. Even though the juvenile's testimony might have implicated her in a criminal act, the court held
that the juvenile could not raise the fifth amendment privilege because she was subject to delinquency proceedings rather than to
criminal prosecution and punishment. The recognition of the
criminal nature of delinquency proceedings which supported the
extension of the right to counsel by the court in A.A. is more durable under close scrutiny. While delinquency proceedings differ
from formal criminal prosecutions, the stigma and effect on the
juvenile of a declaration of delinquency is considerable. The punitive nature of detention bears greater similarity to incarceration,
(particularly in instances of serious conduct) than the court suggests in EL.L.
On appeal, right to counsel violations do not per se constitute
reversible error; instead, they are reviewed under the "harmless
error" test that is routinely applied to other procedural violations. 12 1 In Gipson v. State,122 the court held that the absence of
counsel even at a critical stage of the proceedings (a preliminary
hearing) may be harmless if harmlessness is established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
B.

Bail
Alaska's constitutional right to release on bail is codified in
115.

584 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1978).

116. Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974).
117.

Hoffman v. State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1965). Compare with Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S. 778 (1973) and Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
118. McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975). Compare with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) and Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).

119. 538 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1975). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
120.
121.

572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977).
Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686 (Alaska 1967).

122. 575 P.2d 782 (Alaska 1978).
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AS § 12.30.020 et seq. Bail is a matter of right prior to the trial.
Under the statute, the primary factors to be considered by the
court in establishing bail are danger to the community and likelihood of flight prior to trial. 123 Although bail must be set in a "reasonable sum," in practice it is frequently set so high that it is
unattainable by the defendant. Bail,
in some amount however,
24
must be set for nearly all offenses.
Except for certain serious felonies, 25 the bail statute also allows for bail pending appeal or sentencing following conviction.
As a matter of practice, local courts have required that a variety of
conditions be satisfied prior to release of most defendants on serious offenses. Typically, the courts require that defendant be supervised by a third party, employed while released prior to trial,
and regularly contacted by an attorney or other non-custodial person. Because there is not a competitive market for bail bonds in
most parts of the state, the trial courts have been amenable to
other means of satisfying monetary bail conditions, such as the
posting of property bonds, unsecured personal surety bonds, and
the deposit of ten percent of the established bail with the clerk of
the court to be returned following completion of the case.
C. Arraignment
At arraignment, the accused is brought before the court for
formal advisement of the charges which have been filed against
him, advisement of his constitutional rights, and entry of a plea.
Rule 5 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 26 requires that
a person be brought before a judge or magistrate for arraignment
within twenty-four hours following his arrest. In Padgett v.
State, 27 the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a Rule 5 arraign123. AS § 12.30.020(c), permits the court to take the following factors into consideration: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of the evidence
against the person; the person's family ties; the person's employment; the person's financial
resources; the person's character and mental condition; the length of the person's residence
in the community; the person's record of appearance at court proceedings; and the flight of
the accused to avoid prosecution or his failure to appear at court proceedings.
124. Gilbert v. State, 540 P.2d 485 (Alaska 1975); Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389
(Alaska 1974). The United States Supreme Court has declined vigorously to monitor bail
provisions. See Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
125. AS § 12.30.040 permits release on bail following conviction except in instances of
convictions for first-degree murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, or rape.
126. ALASKA R. CRim. P. 5(a)(1) provides:
Except when the person arrested is issued a citation for a misdemeanor and immediately thereafter released, the arrested person shall be taken before the nearest
available judge or magistrate without unnecessary delay. Unnecessary delay
within the meaning of this section (a) is defined as a period not to exceed twentyfour hours after arrest, including Sundays and holidays.
127. 590 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1979). Compare with Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28
(1962).
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ment proceeding is not a critical stage of the proceedings at which
the accused is entitled to counsel. While a request for counsel at
arraignment must be recognized by the court, failure to provide
counsel at the arraignment is not, per se, reversible error.
Rule 25 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 28 allows
a defendant a single peremptory challenge to the judge assigned to
his case. The Alaska Supreme Court limited the rule in Gieffels v.
State,' 29 holding that the right to challenge a judge peremptorily
does not exist at ministerial proceedings such as arraignments so
long as the substantive rights conferred by AS § 22.20.022130 are
not interfered with and the judge is not called upon to exercise a
discretionary function.
D.

PreliminaryHearingsand GrandJury

Because there is no statutory or constitutional right to a grand
jury indictment or a preliminary hearing, misdemeanor charges
may be initiated by complaint or information. Article I, Section
8131 of the Alaska Constitution, however, like its federal counterpart, 32 mandates that felony charges be initiated by way of a
grand jury indictment.
1. Preliminaryhearing. After arrest and arraignment on a
felony charge, an accused has a right to a preliminary hearing, at
which time the State must establish probable cause before a district court judge or magistrate. The hearing must be held within
ten days following arrest if the accused is in custody or within
twenty days if he is not in custody. 33 Although a preliminary
hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings at which an accused
has a right to counsel, the absence of counsel may be harmless
128. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(1) states, in pertinent part, as follows: "In any criminal
case in Superior or District Court, the prosecution and the defense shall each be entitled as
a matter of right to one change of judge."
129. 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976).
130. AS § 22.20.022 provides for peremptory disqualification of a judge in a district
court action or a superior court action.
131. See note 74 supra.
132. U.S. CONST., amend. V, provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
133. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5.
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error if harmlessness is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 134
2. Grandjury. While establishment of probable cause at a
preliminary hearing is sufficient to hold the defendant for trial,
unless the constitutional and statutory right to indictment by a
grand jury is waived by the accused, an indictment is still required
for felony charges. Although the prosecution need only establish
probable cause at a preliminary hearing,' 35 the burden of proof
before the grand jury is heavier. An indictment by the grand jury
may be returned only if the evidence presented, if not contradicted
136
or explained, would warrant a conviction at trial.
Rule 6 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure' 37 sets out
a variety of regulations concerning the presentation of evidence
before the grand jury. Hearsay evidence, for example, may not be
presented to the grand jury without a "compelling justification."' 13 8 In State v. Gieffels, 139 the court held that the cost of
transporting witnesses, even from out of state, does not constitute
a compelling justification for the use of hearsay testimony. In
Metler v. State, 40 the court similarly rejected a claim of inconvenience to justify hearsay testimony. The admission of hearsay evidence, however, does not automatically invalidate an indictment.
The Alaska court has adopted a "subtraction test": the indictment
will not be dismissed if there is sufficient evidence to support the
return of the indictment. 141
An accused has a right to a fair grand jury proceeding consistent with due process and without improper influence over the
grand jury by the prosecutor. To prevent the grand jury from becoming a tool or rubber stamp of the prosecutor, the trial courts
have been directed to monitor the prosecutor's instructions of law
and arguments to the grand jury and to identify instances of undue influence or unfairness. 42 Following the return of an indictment, the defendant is entitled to a transcript of the evidence
14 3
presented to the grand jury.
134. Martinez v. State, 423 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1967); Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686
(Alaska 1967).
135. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(e).
136. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(q).
137.

138.
Taylor,
139.
140.
141.
(Alaska
142.
143.

See, inparicular,ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(j), (m), (q) and(r).
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(r); Webb v. State, 580 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1978); State v.
566 P.2d 1016 (Alaska 1977); Galauska v. State, 527 P.2d 459 (Alaska 1974).
554 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1976).
581 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1978).
State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1976); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40
1976).
Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
Burkholder v. State, 491 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1971); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(m).

1980]
E.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Discovery

1. Discoveryfrom theprosecution. While Alaska affords defendants broad rights of discovery in Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the supreme court has declined to enforce
the rule aggressively. Pursuant to Rule 16, statements of witnesses, police reports, reports of convictions, and other materials
must be disclosed to the accused. Like the federal rule in Brady v.
Maryland, 44 a prosecutor must disclose all potentially exculpatory evidence. 4 5 In Lauderdale v. State,1 4 6 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the prosecution is required to preserve and produce the test ampules used in connection with breathalyzer examinations in drunk driving cases because such evidence may, upon
testing and examination, prove exculpatory.
As in instances of violations of other procedural rights, the
Alaska Supreme Court applies the harmless error test in assessing
and weighing the effect of discovery violations by the prosecution. 4 7 In Des Jardins v. State,148 the Alaska Supreme Court observed that the lack of prejudice resulting from the prosecution's
discovery violation was purely fortuitous. The court stated: "In
future cases we will continue to scrutinize prosecutorial conduct in
this area, and will not hesitate to reverse where it appears that the
defendant has been prejudiced by such action."' 149 Thereafter,
however, the court in Scharver v. State' 50 held that dismissals for
failure to make discovery are frowned upon, especially where the
information withheld is cumulative. In Stevens v. State,' the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the prosecution failed to permit discovery. In that case, the prosecution failed
to disclose a critical police report. In most cases of discovery violations, however, the courts have declined to severely sanction discovery violations by granting dismissals or reversals on appeal or
by granting lesser sanctions such as continuances or fines.
Although the defendant has been granted broad rights of discovery, the courts have deprived Rule 16 of any significant bite.
144. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); and Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 986 (1972).
145. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3) provides: "The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to
defense counsel any material or information within his possession or control which tends to
negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense or would tend to reduce his punishment
therefore."
146. 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976).
147. Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631 (Alaska 1977); Scharver v. State, 561 P.2d 300
(Alaska 1977).
148. 551 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1976).
149. Id. at 186.
150. 561 P.2d 300 (Alaska 1977).
151. 582 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1978).
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Curiously, violations of procedural rights by police officers sometimes result in more serious sanctions than violations by prosecutors. Applying the exclusionary rule, police violations frequently
result in suppression of critical evidence which sometimes leads to
acquittal. In contrast, violations of procedural rights by prosecutors (who presumably have better training and knowledge of their
obligations) seem to be sanctioned, wherever possible, with trial
continuances and monetary fines.
Frequently, however, discovery violations cannot be adequately remedied by the granting of a continuance or other intermediate sanctions. Like justice delayed, late discovery often
denies a defendant an important opportunity to examine, analyze,
and meet the prosecution's evidence. Disclosure of important information on the eve or in the middle of trial frequently has a
devastating effect on the presentation and defense of a criminal
case. In the final analysis, the existing approach to the application
and enforcement of the discovery provisions does not adequately
protect the rights of the defendant.
2. Discoveryfrom accused. Rule 16 also grants the prosecution certain discovery rights, including the rights to have a defendant appear in a lineup, provide other physical, nontestimonial
evidence (hair, fingernail clippings, etc.), and provide reports of
experts who will testify at trial. 152 Although notice of intent to
rely upon a defense of alibi or insanity must be provided to the
prosecution,' 53 the Alaska Supreme Court in Scott v. State' 54 held
that an accused need not disclose a list of potential alibi witnesses.
F. Speedy Trial
Article I, Section 7'55 of the Alaska Constitution ensures the
right to a speedy trial for persons charged with criminal offenses.
The constitutional guarantee has been codified in Rule 45, Alaska
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 156 That provision requires that an
accused be brought to trial within 120 days of his arrest or the
initiation of charges.
Referred to as the "four-month rule," Rule 45 requires that
the prosecution bring an accused to trial within 120 days following
152. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(3).
154. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).

153.

Compare with Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470

(1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); and Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56,
372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
155. See note 2 supra.
156. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45(b) provides: "A defendant charged with either a felony or
a misdemeanor shall be tried within 120 days from the time set forth in Section (c)."
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his arrest or initiation of charges. In Peterkin v. State, 5 7 the court
held that a period of 140 days following arrest violated that rule.
Dismissal of the charges is the only remedy recognized by the
court for Rule 45 violations. In computing the 120-day period,
certain periods of delay resulting from defense motions'5 8 or
caused by the unavailability of the defendant' 5 9 are excluded in
calculating the time for trial.
While an accused is under no affirmative obligation to demand a speedy trial, the defendant's silence in setting a trial date
may constitute an acquiescence to any delay. In DeMille v.
State, 60 the court held that the defendant, who was represented
by counsel at the time of the trial setting, impliedly acquiesced to
a trial setting beyond the 120-day rule. DeMille tempered the earlier decision in Peterkin v. State' 6' where the court stated that for
the purposes of determining whether a speedy trial violation existed it was not relevant that the defendant failed to affirmatively
demand a trial.
Until Peterson v. State, 62 it was unclear whether the
mandatory requirements of Rule 45 could be relaxed pursuant to
Rule 53 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure. 63 In Peterson
v. State, 64 the defendant was brought to trial on a multiple homicide charge 136 days after initiation of the case. On appeal, the
court held that the requirements of Rule 45 can be relaxed in certain instances and that the relaxation in Peterson was justified because the case was brought in the Alaska bush, the delay was
short, the crime was serious, and there was no apparent prejudice
65
to the defendant.
When Rule 45 was adopted, the trial courts were not prepared to monitor criminal cases and ensure that they come to trial
within the 120-day period. After the Alaska Supreme Court made
it clear in Peterkin v. State166 that the responsibility of setting trials within the 120-day period rests with the courts, adequate pro157. 543 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1975).
158. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45(d)(i).
159. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45(d)(4).

160. 581 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1978).
161. 543 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1975).
162. 562 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1977).
163. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53, provides: "These rules are designed to facilitate business
and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where.
it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them will work injustice."
164. 562 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1977).
165. Id. at 1360.
166. 543 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1975). Although Congress has adopted a speedy trial act
similar to Rule 45, the Supreme Court has declined to adopt a set standard for speedy trial
violations and has reviewed each case individually. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
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cedures were developed. Now, at the time of arraignment in
felony cases, the defense and the prosecution are asked to stipulate
to or argue the date when the 120-day period is deemed to have
commenced in the case. Similar procedures have been developed
in the district courts. As a result, dismissals for speedy trial violations have significantly decreased.

III.

RIGHTS DURING TRIAL

Unlike the liberal approach to various pre-trial rights, Alaska
has followed the mainstream in adopting and enforcing procedural rights at the trial stage.
A.

Right to Jury Trial

Rule 23 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 67 provides that a jury trial shall be provided in instances where the accused is constitutionally entitled to one unless the right has been
clearly waived by the defendant. The jury trial right is embodied
in Article I, Section 11168 of the Alaska Constitution. In construing the constitutional limits to the right to a jury trial, the Alaska
Supreme Court has applied the same test that is used in determin169
ing the right to counsel. The court in Baker v. City of Fairbanks
held that a jury trial is afforded whenever the accused is subject to
incarceration, loss of a valuable license, or a fine in an amount
denoting criminality. In Johansen v. State, 70 the court held that a
defendant in a civil contempt action for failure to pay child support is entitled to a jury trial because of the possibility of incarceration.
While the right to a jury trial, like other procedural rights,
may be waived by the defendant,' 7 ' the court is required to address the defendant personally and inquire whether the waiver is
made knowingly and voluntarily. 72 An inquiry directed to the
defendant's attorney will not suffice. The court in Walker v.
State 17 3 held that the failure of the trial court to address the de167. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 23(a) provides: "Cases required to be tried by a jury shall be
so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court
and the consent of the State."
Rule 23 merely parrots the constitutional authorization for a jury trial. See Walker v.
State, 578 P.2d 1388 (Alaska 1978).
168. See note 3 supra.
169. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). Compare with Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
170. 491 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1971).
171. Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388 (Alaska 1978).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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fendant personally constitutes error per se.
The defendant is entitled to a jury comprised of a representative cross section of the community. 174 To achieve this goal, Rule
24 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 75 authorizes voir
dire of prospective jurors and affords the state six peremptory
challenges and the defendant ten in felony cases. In misdemeanor
cases each party is permitted three peremptory challenges.
The Alaska Supreme Court has never considered the manner
in which the voir dire of prospective jurors should be conducted.
The practices in the trial courts vary throughout the state. Some
judges permit an open-ended and unrestricted voir dire of the venire; other judges conduct most of the voir dire themselves, permitting limited questioning by counsel either directly or by
written questions read by the trial judge.
B.

Nolo Contendere Pleas

Rule 11 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure1 76 authorizes the entry of guilty, not guilty, and nolo contendere pleas.
The nolo plea has much the same effect as a guilty plea and, like a
plea of guilty or a finding of guilty by the jury,7 7 results in a judgment and conviction. Still, the plea has some special utility. A
conviction following a plea of nolo contendere may not be used in
subsequent civil proceedings involving the same conduct as that
charged in the criminal case.' 7 8 The nolo plea does not constitute
an admission of civil liability and may not be used to establish
civil liability.
In Lowell v. State, 79 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
conviction supported by a plea of nolo contendere may be used to
impeach a defendant's testimony at a subsequent proceeding, assuming the offense is one involving dishonesty or false statement
and meets the other criteria set forth in Rule 26 of the Alaska
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 80
174. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24.1; see also Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska
1971).
175. ALASKA R. CiuM. P. 24(d) provides for the exercise of peremptory challenges following the completion of all challenges for cause of prospective jurors. If there is more
than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges
and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
176. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1 (a) provides: "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or
nolo contendere. If a defendant refuses to plead, stands mute, or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty."
177. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. I 1(c); Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d
801 (Alaska 1978); Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974).
178. See Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1978).
179. Id.
180. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 26(f)(1), (2) provide:
(1) GeneralRule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
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Pleas of nolo contendere may be conditioned upon the preservation of the defendant's right to appeal certain issues. The
Cooksey rule (named for Cooksey v. State, 18' which established
the procedure by which issues could be reserved for appeal upon
pleas of nolo contendere) was subsequently modified and limited
in Oveson v. Municipality ofAnchorage.182 In that case, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that an appeal may be taken following a plea
of nolo contendere only in instances where the prosecution stipulates that resolution of the issue would be dispositive of the entire
case. The Oveson gloss to the Cooksey rule was a product of the
Supreme Court's frustration with hearing and deciding appeals involving issues not dispositive of the underlying case. An appeal
following a plea of nolo contendere conditioned upon the right to
appeal non-dispositive issues was viewed as a means of circumventing the standards for interlocutory review set out in Rules 23
and 24, Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure.
C.

Guilty Pleas

Rule 11 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure contains
the guidelines for entering a guilty plea. The court is required to
address the defendant personally and inquire as to whether the
plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 83 The
court must advise the defendant of the various rights (right to confront witnesses, right to trial by jury, presumption of innocence,
etc.) which he is waiving by entering his plea. 84 A court's failure
to make a sufficient inquiry is not reversible error unless it affects
85
important rights of the accused.
86
In Morgan v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court repudiated
the rule of Sieling v. Eyeman.' 87 The court in Sieling held that an
accused need be "more competent" to waive trial rights than he
dence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime
involved dishonesty or false statement.
(2) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this Rule is inadmissible if a
period of more than five years has elapsed since the date of the conviction of the
witness.
See also Richardson v. state, 579 P.2d 1372 (Alaska 1978); Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281
(Alaska 1978); Smith v. Beavers, 554 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1976).
181. 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974).
182. 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978).
183. See Joe v. State, 565 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1977); Else v. State, 555 P.2d 1210 (Alaska
1976); Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1976); Barrett v. State, 544 P.2d 830 (Alaska
1975); McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974); Ingram v. State, 450 P.2d 161
(Alaska 1969); Thompson v. State, 426 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1967); State v. Pete, 420 P.2d 338
(Alaska 1966).
184. Id.
185. Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1976).
186. 582 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1978).
187. 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
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does to stand trial. The Alaska court, noting that few courts have

approved the Sieling approach, denied the defendant's assertion
(unsupported by the record)
that he was incompetent when he en88
plea.1
guilty
his
tered
Alaska's criminal rules do not specifically address the issue of
plea bargaining. Plea bargaining in most cases was abolished in
1975 by the Attorney General of the State of Alaska. In State v.
Buckalew, 18 9 the Alaska Supreme Court held that trial judges
could not participate in plea or sentence bargaining by indicating,
prior to entry of the plea, the nature of the sentence that would be
imposed upon the defendant by a plea.
D.

Severance

1. Severance of defendants. Pursuant to Rule 14 of the
Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, 90 any co-defendant who is

being prosecuted in a joint proceeding can move for severance if
the joinder is prejudicial. Unlike other procedural rights, the propriety of severance is left to the trial judge's discretion and on
appeal, reversible error will not be found unless the defendant can

establish both prejudice and an abuse of discretion on the part of

the trial judge.' 9 1
In Larson v. State, 92 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
joinder of two brothers in a single proceeding was not prejudicial
where one was charged with assault at a gas station and the other
was charged in connection with a shooting at the same gas station.
Where the prosecution seeks to introduce statements or confes-

sions into evidence, joinder of co-defendants may pose Bruton' 93

188. 582 P.2d at 1021. See also Note, Competence to Plead and the Retarded Defendant:
United States v. Masthers, 539 F2d 721 (1976), 9 CONN. L.*REv. 176, 185 (1976). See also
McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 660, opinion on rehearing, 570 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1977);
Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 802-03 (Alaska 1974).
189. 561 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1977). Prior to the ban on plea bargaining, ALASKA R.
CRIM. P. 11 (e) required that counsel for the state and the defendant disclose to the court
the terms and conditions of plea agreements and bargains whereby pleas of guilty and nolo
contendere were entered by the defendant in the expectation that a specific sentence would
be imposed or other charges before the court would be dismissed.
190. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or
of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on
the motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the
state to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions
made by the defendants which the state intends to introduce at the trial.
191. Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553 (Alaska 1978); Richards v. State, 451 P.2d 359
(Alaska 1969); Selman v. State, 406 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1965).
192. 566 P.2d 1019 (Alaska 1977).
193. The Bruton rule is derived from Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); see
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problems. As recognized in Bruton v. United States, 94 the joinder
of co-defendants for trial may violate the right to confrontation
where one co-defendant makes a statement or confession implicating the other. The confrontation problem arises when the statement or confession is admitted in the prosecution's case and the
co-defendant making the statement declines to testify pursuant to
his constitutional right to remain silent. In this situation, the implicated defendant is deprived the opportunity to confront the witness (his co-defendant) testifying against him.
Although some restriction of the Bruton rule can be detected
in recent federal decisions, 195 the rule is still adhered to in Alaska.
In Mead v. State, 96 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the admission of three confessions at trial violated the defendant's right
to confrontation. Similarly, the court in Benefield v. State197 held
that the testimony of a police officer which summarized the confession of a co-defendant deprived the defendant of his right to
confrontation and was therefore improperly admitted by the trial
court.
2. Severance of charges. Rule 14 also permits the severance
of multiple charges alleged against a single defendant. There are
several ways in which prejudice results from the consolidation of
multiple charges in a single proceeding. The first occurs where a
defendant wishes to testify on one of the charges, but not on the
other.19 8 The nature and effect of this type of prejudice was concisely summarized by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Cross v. UnitedStates.199 In that case, the
court stated:
If he [the defendant] testifies on one count, he runs the risk that
any adverse effects will influence the jury's consideration of the
other count. Thus, he bears the risk on both counts, although
he may benefit on only one. Moreover, a defendant's silence on
one count would be damaging in the face of his express denial
of the other. Thus he may be coerced into testifying on the
count upon which he wished to remain silent. It is not necessary to decide whether this invades his constitutional right to
remain silent, since we think it constitutes prejudice within the
also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
194. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
195. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S.
427 (1972); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
196. 504 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1971).
197. 559 P.2d 91 (Alaska 1977).
198. See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 1966); Drew v. United
States, 331 F.2d 85, 88, n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 222, at 437 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
199. 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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meaning of Rule 14.2 00
The Cross analysis of the severance problem was adopted by the
Alaska Supreme Court in Cleveland v. State.20'
The possibility that the jury will draw an unfavorable inference about the defendant and cumulate the evidence against him
has been recognized as the second type of possible prejudice
caused by consolidation of charges. 20 2 This inference may become particularly prejudicial in cases where the proof of one
count is stronger than that of the other. The jury may be induced
to convict a defendant on a weaker count because it is swayed by
proof supporting the stronger count.
The third type of prejudice posed by consolidation is the possiblity that the proof of the defendant's guilt of one crime may be
used to convict him of another, even though the evidence proving
guilt for the former crime would have been inadmissible in a separate trial. 20 3 In Stevens v. State ,2 4 the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the possibility of serious prejudice where a defendant is
jointly tried for several similar offenses. Criticism of joinder of
similar offenses has been extensive; only the federal courts and
one-third of the states currently allow it; all other states prohibit
205
such joinder entirely or upon the defendant's objection.
In Stevens, the court stated:
[W]e think it appropriate to note our agreement with the criticism which has been directed against a procedural rule which
permits the joinder of offenses of the same or similar character.
We think that in general such joinders are to be avoided and
that in those instances where the prosecution has joined offenses of the same or similar character the court, on motion
by
20 6
the accused, should grant a severance of such charges.
Thus, while the Alaska Supreme Court has left the disposition of
severance issues to the trial court's discretion, the court in Stevens
provided a strong statement favoring severance of similar charges
whenever the accused objects to their joinder. This position is the
same position that has been adopted by the American Bar Association in its Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance.
200. Id. at 989 (footnotes omitted).
201. 538 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1975).
202. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
203. Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Baker v. United States,
401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968),cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Cross v. United States, 335
F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
204. 582 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1978).
205. See A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.2; see also 8
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.02[1], n.3 (2d ed. 1976); Dingier v. State, 211 S.E.2d 752
(Ga. 1955). Among the states prohibiting similar character joinder by statute are, Oregon

(OR. REV. STAT. § 132.560 (1970)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 226 (West 1951)),
and Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 111-14 (1970)).
206. 582 P.2d at 629 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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E. Presence of the Defendant
It is well-recognized that a defendant has a right to be present
during the proceedings against him. Still, the Alaska Supreme
Court has been called upon to review several situations in which
proceedings transpired in the defendant's absence.
1. Playbacks. In Alaska, trial testimony is electronically recorded. During the course of deliberations, juries frequently request playbacks of various portions of the testimony to assist them
in rendering a verdict. In State v. Hannagan,20 7 the Alaska
Supreme Court construed Rule 38(a) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, 20 8 which requires a defendant's presence at "every
stage of the trial," to include playbacks of testimony. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant's right to be present while
testimony is replayed may not be waived by his counsel, but that
the violation of Rule 38 was harmless.
2. Other situations. Several cases have posed questions concerning the right of a defendant to be present during other stages
in the criminal proceedings. In Cox v. State,20 9 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that communications by the court to the jury,
out of the presence of the defendant and his attorney, was reversible error because there was no way of proving that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, the court in
Kimoktoak v. State2 10 found error where the trial court, in the
absence of the defendant, heard arguments of counsel on the
jury's request for a playback on the issue of sequestration of the
jury. Finally, in Johnson v. State2 11 the court found error where
the trial court, in violation of Rule 31 of the Alaska Rules of
Criminal Procedure, ordered a sealed verdict without the defendant's consent.
207. 559 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1977).
208.

ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 38(a) provides:

The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the preliminary hearing, at
the time of plea, at the omnibus hearing, and at every stage of the trial, including
the impaneling of the jury and return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided in this rule.
209. 575 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1978). See also Koehler v. State, 519 P.2d 442 (Alaska
1974); Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405 (Alaska 1968); Egelak v. State, 438 P.2d 712 (Alaska
1968); Kugzruk v. State, 436 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1968); and Noflke v. State, 422 P.2d 102
(Alaska 1967).
210. 578 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1978).
211. 577 P.2d 1063 (Alaska 1978). Rule 31 has since been changed to permit authorization of a sealed verdict without the defendant's consent. See ALASKA R. CiUM. P. 31 (t).
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F.

Confrontation

In 1979, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the Alaska Rules
of Evidence. The Rules apply to both civil and criminal cases.
Because of the constitutional right to confront witnesses, criminal
cases sometimes pose evidentiary problems not present in civil
cases. Although confrontation problems are frequently confused
with the prohibition against introducing hearsay evidence, it is important to recognize that the right to confront witnesses may be
violated in criminal cases even where exceptions to the hearsay
rule may render out-of-court statements admissible.
In Davis v. State,21 2 the defendant sought to invade the statutory protection afforded juvenile delinquency proceedings in order
to confront and cross-examine his juvenile accuser in an effort to
establish bias and interest on the part of the witness. Although
the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the defendant's confrontation
claim, the United States Supreme Court reversed on appeal. In
Davis v. Alaska,21 3 the United States Supreme Court held that the
secrecy of juvenile proceedings provided by statute must give way
to the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him.
The Court ordered disclosure of the prior juvenile record of the
prosecution's witness.
The Alaska Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Salazar v.
State.21 4 In that case, the defendant sought to limit the marital
communications privilege in order fully to cross-examine and confront the prosecution witness concerning an inconsistent statement
and bias. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that the privilege provided by Rule 26 of the
Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure would have to give way to
the constitutional right of confrontation. The court in Salazar
stated:
When, as in Davis and this case, the defendant's right to confront effectively the witnesses against him by exploring their
possible bias or prejudice is balanced against a rule based
solely on policy grounds, the defendant's constitutional rights
must prevail. . . . We thus hold that when conffict is found between the constitutional right of confrontation and the exercise
on public policy, the constitutional right
of a privilege2 based
5
must control. '
Thus Davis and Salazar,taken together, firmly establish that
neither statutory nor rule privileges of non-disclosure may obstruct the right of an accused to fully confront the witnesses
212.
213.
214.
215.

499 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1972).
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976).
/d. at 79.

UCLA-ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:109

against him. These decisions recognize the importance of crossexamination in a criminal trial as a means of testing the evidence
presented and establishing all the facts which might bear on the
credibility of a witness.
G.

Sentencing

Following conviction after trial or entry of a guilty plea, Rule
32 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a presentence report be prepared prior to sentencing in all felony cases.
The report may include references to arrests and charges which
were not prosecuted if the defendant has an opportunity to explain such instances and present rebuttal evidence. In Nukapigak
v. State,2 16 the court held that mere police "contacts" which are
not explained may not be used in the report or considered by the
court in sentencing. When defense counsel believes that improper
materials have been included in the pre-sentence report, a request
may be made that a judge other than the sentencing judge review
the pre-sentence report and delete improper items. This procedure avoids the possibility of the improper material tainting the
sentencing judge's thoughts or attitude about the case.
In 1969, the Alaska Legislature granted to the Alaska
Supreme Court the jurisdiction to hear and review appeals of
sentences.21 7 The expansion of the court's jurisdiction in this area
was aimed at establishing guidelines to protect defendants against
unsupportably harsh sentences and to achieve some measure of
uniformity in sentencing in Alaska.
21
All sentences in excess of forty-five days may be appealed.
In examining the sentence imposed, however, the supreme court
will not reverse a sentence
unless it finds that the trial court was
"clearly mistaken. ' 21 9 The appropriate factors to be considered
by a trial court in imposing a sentence were articulated in State v.
Chaney.220 Alaska's new criminal code contains presumptive sentencing provisions which substantially alter
the process by which
221
sentences may be imposed and reviewed.
216. 562 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1977).
217. AS § 12.55.120.
218. ALASKA R. App. P. 21.
219. McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1974).
220. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
221. See AS § 12.55.125 et seq., andpartiuarly, AS § 12.55.155, identifying factors in
aggravation and mitigation to be considered by the court in applying the presumptive
sentences set out in AS §§ 12.55.125, 12.55.135, 12.55.140. For a history of sentence appeals in Alaska, see Erwin, Five Years ofSentence Review in Alaska, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L.
REv. I (1975).
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IV.

A.

POST-CONVICTION RIGHTS

Modification of Sentence

Rule 35 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure permits
the trial court to correct or reduce a sentence after it has been
imposed. In addition to the authority of the trial court to modify
sentences pursuant to Rule 35(a), Rule 35(b) permits convicted
and sentenced persons to petition for relief where:
(1) The conviction or sentence was in violation of the State or
Federal Constitution;
(2) The court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
(3) The sentence imposed was not authorized by law;
(4) There exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice;
(5) The Defendant is unlawfully held in custody;
(6) The conviction or sentence is subject to collateral attack
under any common law, statutory or other writ, proceeding, or remedy;
(7) There has been a significant change in law.
B.

Double Jeopardy

Article I, Section 9222 of the Alaska Constitution parallels the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution 223 and provides
that no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
In Torres v. State,224 the Alaska Supreme Court followed the prevailing federal rule and held that jeopardy attaches when the trial
jury is sworn. In a series of cases commencing with Whitton v.
State,22 5 the Alaska court has held that although defendants may
be subjected to multiple charges arising out of a single course of
conduct or action, a defendant may not be subjected to multiple
punishments for the "same offense." In determining whether multiple charges constitute the "same offense" for purposes of punishment, the court must analyze whether the offenses involve
differences in intent or conduct. Any such differences found must
then be balanced against societal interests, taking into account
whether the differences are substantial enough to warrant multiple
punishments. 226 The Alaska Supreme Court stated in Whitton
that the social interests to be considered include: "[t]he nature of
personal, property or other rights sought to be protected, and the
222. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9 provides: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for
the same offense. No person shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness
against himself."
223. See note 132 supra.
224. 519 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1974).
225. 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970).
226. Id. at 312.
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broad objectives of criminal law such as punishment of the criminal for his crime, rehabilitation of the criminal, and the prevention of future crimes." 2271f the multiple charges do not reflect
significant or substantial differences in intent or conduct in relation to the social interests involved, multiple punishments may not
jeopbe imposed without violating the prohibition against double
228
Constitutions.
Federal
and
State
the
in
contained
ardy
CONCLUSION-

This article has attempted to identify the areas of criminal
procedure where Alaska has departed from established lines of
authority and has enhanced the procedural rights afforded an accused. The greatest expansion of rights has occurred in the investigative and pre-trial stages of the proceedings. The procedural
rights afforded an accused during a criminal trial and following
his conviction do not significantly depart from those which are
afforded by other states or the federal courts. Once formal
charges have been initiated, and, more clearly, once an accused is
brought to trial, he receives few benefits, rights, or protections not
provided defendants in other jurisdictions.
In establishing the permissible limits of reasonable searches
and seizures, the right to counsel, the right to fair and impartial
grand jury proceedings, the right to discovery, and the right to a
speedy trial, the Alaska Supreme Court has taken a more generous view of the rights of an accused. These five areas of procedure
have an element in common. Each constitutes a point in the criminal process at which the prosecution has a clear advantage over
the accused. The accused is not able to participate in or influence
the acquisition of evidence, the conducting of a criminal investigation, and the initiation of charges. The protection of the individual during these stages of the criminal process can be viewed as an
attempt by the Alaska Supreme Court to equalize the prosecution's procedural advantage over the accused. However, once formal charges are initiated and trial commences, the court has been
reluctant to continue providing enhanced procedural protections
to the accused.

227. Id.
228. Id.

